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The Lost Trail of Dewey
Eco’s Problematic Debt to Pragmatism
Robert E. Innis
 
1. A Problematic Debt
1 Umberto  Eco’s  philosophical  project,  which  culminates  in  the  development  of  a
systematic and philosophically relevant semiotics, has a perplexing and problematic debt
to  and  link  with  pragmatism  in  its  many  forms.  Indeed,  his  apparent  relation  to
pragmatism as such is in fact quite tangential if we ignore the pivotal role of Peirce in
defining and supporting Eco’s explicit semiotic turn. Eco’s appropriation of Peirce was
highly selective. It focused predominantly, as one would expect, on central foreground
features  of  Peirce’s  theory  of  signs:  the  schemas  of  sign  functions,  the  nature  of
interpretants,  problems  surrounding  iconism,  and,  perhaps  most  importantly,  the
heuristic fertility of Peirce’s notion of semiotic openness or infinite semiosis for a theory
of the interpretation of texts,  primarily linguistic but also in an extended sense with
respect to aesthetic ‘texts’ in general. 
2 Peirce’s metaphysical categories play a negligible role in Eco’s world view, which was
expressed already in his early works, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas (1988) [hereafter:
ATA] and The Open Work (1989) [hereafter: OW]. In these two books much is made of the
emergent  picture  of  a  decentered  cosmos,  permeated  by  forces  of  cosmic  drift  that
marked the putative radical break with the classical and medieval and even early modern
world  view.  Eco  saw  the  work  of  James  Joyce  as  a  prime  linguistic-aesthetic
exemplification of the nature and scope of the bewildering effects as well as implications
of this turn in our world picture – or at least of our Western world picture rooted in
classical Greek philosophy and the type of aesthetics systematized by Aquinas, even if not
completely exemplified in other Medieval  reflections on art  and beauty of  a  broader
phenomenological scope, which Eco examined in his Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, with
which I will not be concerned in this essay. 
3 However, looked at as a philosopher, Eco did not utilize the analytical tools or engage the
full  range  of  concerns  of  the  whole  pragmatist  tradition  to  develop  a  distinctively
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‘pragmatist’  semiotics  or  even  a  ‘pragmatist’  aesthetics  or  ‘pragmatist’  account  of
experience. The themes of the Jamesian philosophical project of a radical empiricism,
with its wide range of concerns extending, developing, and modifying the philosophical
thrust of his great Principles of Psychology and mirroring in existential and experiential
detail  Peirce’s  ‘vitally  important  questions,’  and  the  descriptive  thickness  of  Mead’s
attempt to develop a nuanced pragmatist social psychology, which is clearly linked with a
social semiotics and the social matrices of the formation of the semiotic self,  play no
meaningful role in Eco’s work. 
4 Nevertheless some strong links to John Dewey’s Art as Experience (1934) [hereafter: AE] in
Eco’s  first  two  books  provoke  reflection  and  can  help  us  situate  Eco’s  relation  to
pragmatism.  But  Dewey  plays  no  important  thematic  or  explicit  role  in  Eco’s  work
thereafter. Such an absence raises a question about a ‘path not taken’ or a ‘lost trail’ in
Eco’s philosophical wanderings and on any attempt to link him, as a philosopher, with
pragmatism as a whole, which is not by any means identical with, or represented by,
Peirce.  Such  a  situation  is  all  the  more  perplexing  in  light  of  Eco’s  remark  in  his
autobiography  about  the  essential  formative  and  liberatory  role  of  Dewey’s  Art  as
Experience in  freeing  him from the  Idealistic  premises  and  tendencies  of  the  Italian
philosophical and aesthetic thought of his student days, exemplified in various degrees in
the work of his teacher, Luigi Pareyson. 
5 Paradoxically, there are substantive links of a phenomenological order between Pareyson
and Dewey, once one gets past their different metaphysical premises with their religious
implications. Eco’s ‘secular’ turn is paralleled by Dewey’s naturalistic turn, but Dewey
turned it  into a kind of  existential  empowerment without the hint  of  a  perhaps not
unjustified  nostalgia  that  lingered  in  Eco.  Dewey’s  picture  of  the  universe  was  of  a
“moving unbalanced balance of things” (Dewey 1925: 341). In such a world, Dewey writes
in Human Nature and Conduct, we are in need of objects and symbols that grasp and hold
our consciousness, giving us a sense of “encompassing continuities with their infinite
reach”  and  of  the  “enduring  and  comprehending  whole”  (Dewey  1922:  226).  But,
practicing  a  kind  of  pragmatist  hermeneutics  of  suspicion,  Dewey  warns  against
attachment to symbols “which no longer serve, especially since men have been idolators
worshiping symbols as things,” even if in these symbols there is still “some trace of a vital
and enduring reality” (1922: 226). It is sentiments such as these, a sentiment of ‘cosmicity’
informed by a religious naturalism that Eco saw latent in certain sides of Dewey’s Art as
Experience although he distanced himself  from it  on the philosophical  and existential
plane. 
6 Art as Experience appears to be the only major work of Dewey that Eco read, or at least
cited,  although there  are  allusions  in  Kant  and  the  Platypus  (1999)  [hereafter:  KP]  to
Dewey’s connection with a ‘transactional’ theory in the psychology of perception and to
the Peircean background to his ‘detranscendentalized’ notion of ‘warranted assertion.’
The lack of any serious engagement with Dewey outside of the contexts of Eco’s first two
books is a pity. In certain important respects Dewey’s pragmatism, which itself was not
developed without adverting to Peirce, can extend, enrich, and even recontextualize both
Eco’s  ‘presemiotic’  early work and his  predominantly Peircean later investigations of
perception, language, meaning, art, and social forms, themes that were the focal points of
Dewey’s own life long reflections. 
7 Clearly, I cannot fully engage all these topics in the course of one essay. Instead, I will
trace  the  links,  both  historical  and systematic,  connecting  Dewey’s  experience-based
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pragmatist aesthetics with Eco’s ultimate framing of the task of aesthetics in semiotic
terms. Eco himself in A Theory of Semiotics (1978) [hereafter: TS] wrote that one of the
tasks of semiotics was to deal with “the genesis of perceptual signification” at the lower
thresholds of experience “where referents are no longer confronted as explicit messages
but as extremely ambiguous texts akin to aesthetic ones” (TS 167). Dewey formulated his
fundamental principle in the following way: “The thing most fundamental to esthetic
experience [is] that it is perceptual.” (AE 222). When Dewey claimed that it is “to esthetic
experience […] the philosopher must go to understand what experience is” (AE 278), the
aim was not just to understand it, but to be challenged by it. What a work of art does,
Dewey argues, is to “concentrate and enlarge an immediate experience […] the meanings
imaginatively summoned, assembled, and integrated are embodied in material existence
that here and now interacts with the self.  The work of art is thus a challenge to the
performance of a like act of evocation and organization, through imagination, on the part
of the one who experiences it.” (AE 277). 
8 Perception, signification, and interpretation are inextricably linked. This is the Deweyan
thread whose wandering lines in Eco I will trace in the following discussion.
 
2. Deweyan Threads in The Aesthetics of Thomas
Aquinas
9 In  The  Aesthetics  of  Thomas  Aquinas,  in  the  chapter,  “The Formal  Criteria  of  Beauty,”
discussing the notion of proportion or consonantia in Aquinas, Eco writes:
[…]  proportion  is  based  upon  the  vital  reality  of  form  […].  It  does  not  signify
something static and crystallized in a motionless perfection, but rather a dynamic
unity. It is a dynamic unity because it involves a combining of living forces which
do not annul or rigidify themselves when they combine; rather, they confer life
upon  a  type  of  activity  whose  value  derives  from  their  several  vigorous  and
operative energies. The result is one of unity in variety, a unity which does not
constrict the multiplicity of movement but merely regulates it and directs it to its
end. (ATA 95)
10 A reader may be shocked by what follows in what could be considered a kind of Urtext of
Eco’s intellectual career since it comes from a philosophical tradition so different from
that in which this still readable and admirable book on Aquinas arises. It is a long passage
from John Dewey’s Art as Experience. Here is the text cited by Eco.
There is an old formula for beauty in nature and art: Unity in variety. Everything
depends upon how the proposition “in” is understood. There may be many articles
in a box, many figures in a single painting, many coins in one pocket, and many
documents  in  a  safe.  The unity  is  extraneous and the many are  unrelated.  The
significant point is that unity and manyness are always this sort or approximate it
when the unity of the object or scene is morphological and static. The formula has
meaning only when its  terms are understood to concern a  relation of  energies.
There is no fullness, no many parts, without distinctive differentiations. But they
have esthetic quality, as in the richness of a musical phrase, only when distinctions
depend upon reciprocal resistances. There is unity only when the resistances create
a  suspense  that  is  resolved  through  cooperative  interaction  of  the  opposed
energies. The “one” of the formula is the realization through interacting parts of
their  respective  energies.  The  “many”  is  the  manifestation  of  the  defined
individualization due to the opposed forces that finally sustain a balance. (AE 166) 
The Lost Trail of Dewey
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-1 | 2018
3
11 Eco  then  comments  on  the  preceding  passage  by  offering  a  Deweyan  gloss  on  or
affirmation of one of Aquinas’s core insights. But such an interpretation contravenes one
of his objections to Neo-scholastic attempts to see things in Aquinas that are not there or
to use them for their own (misguided) purposes. Eco’s book is in fact not just an historical
reconstruction but in a way just as much a selective validation of aesthetic concepts in
Aquinas which, as it turned out, bordered on Dewey’s framework. Eco writes:
It seems to me that formal proportion, as defined by Aquinas, has precisely these
dynamic characteristics, just because it is proportion in an organism which exists,
which lives. There is a dynamic tension which causes matter and form to combine
in  the  individual,  and  a  dynamic  tension  which  transports  essence  into  the
excitement  of  existence.  If  we  leave  the  plane  of  metaphysics,  we  still  find  a
dynamic  tension among the  parts  of  things,  and between subject  and object  in
cognition. All proportion is dynamic, because it is the coefficient of perfection, the
coefficient of existence. (ATA 96) 
12 There are no other references to Dewey in this book. But there are echoes of central
Deweyan themes throughout Eco’s reconstruction of Aquinas’s aesthetics: form, relation
of energies, distinctive differentiations within the art work, the creation of suspense, the
notion  of  esthetic  quality,  reciprocal  resistances,  cooperative  interaction  of  opposed
energies, defined individualization, balance, and so forth. Other Deweyan notions appear
in a different format, but not linked explicitly to him. One familiar with Dewey’s Art as
Experience has  a  lingering  uneasiness  about  the  neutrality  of  Eco’s  historical
reconstruction of Aquinas’s aesthetics.
13 For  example,  in  the  discussion of  Aquinas’s  opusculum,  De  Mixtione  Elementorum,  Eco
thinks that its import transcends the context in which Aquinas developed his thoughts
about  bodies  composed  of  other  bodies  or  elements.  In  such  bodies,  Eco  writes,
paraphrasing  Aquinas,  the  qualities  of  the  simpler  bodies  are  “turned  toward  and
absorbed into  a  new quality  which belongs  properly  to  the  new mixed body  and is
dependent on its form.” Such qualities, as Eco puts it, “survive as a continual alignment of
the  active  ‘virtues’  of  the  simple  bodies”  (ATA 96).  The notion of  ‘active  powers’  or
“dynamic energies, which subsist and remain active” in the ‘mixed body,’ is actually the
source of its life, or what Susanne Langer called its ‘livingness.’  The pivotal notion is
‘formal dynamism,’ a fusion or integration of form and energy. This is the mark of every
“organism that exists, whether natural or artistic, spiritual or sensible” (ATA 97). Such a
remark is a mélange of different terminological frames. Eco’s foregrounding of such a
notion is perhaps not in itself an anachronism, but the use of the term ‘organism’ in an
aesthetic context is likely influenced by his reading of Dewey. This is made even more
likely by what follows. Speaking of proportion, looked at transcendentally, as having an
infinity of analogues, Eco writes: “Every existent, beautiful in that it possesses existence,
can present us with new and unsuspected types of proportion. The possible proportions
are infinite in number, both in the world of nature and in art.” (ATA 97). This is what
Dewey is referring to in his remark that an art work is a “unique transcript of the energy
of  things  of  the  world”  (AE 189).  Art,  Dewey  writes,  “intercepts  every  shade  of
expressiveness found in objects and orders them in a new experience of life” (AE 110).
14 Later, in the chapter on the aesthetic visio and the ‘peace’ that marks it, Eco writes of a
“balance of energies” inducing a peace that on the epistemological level means “the total
delight of a contemplative perception which, freed from desire and effort, experiences
love of the harmony which the intellectual judgment has shown to it” (ATA 200). As to
balance of energies, Dewey writes that the “final measure of balance or symmetry is the
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capacity of the whole to hold together within itself the greatest variety and scope of
opposed elements” (AE 184).  The love of a harmony is love of a particular quality of
experiencing,  a quality that is  a  Peircean ‘tone.’  Eco,  arguing against  Maritain’s  neo-
Scholastic reconstruction of Aquinas, denies that this experience is something that occurs
prior  to  the  labor  of  abstraction  which  would,  according  to  Maritain,  introduce  an
extraneous  intellectual  element  into  the aesthetic  visio.  According to  Eco,  seemingly
following Aquinas but perhaps also indicating his own position at that time, “aesthetic
pleasure is total and complete because it is connected with a cessation of the efforts of
abstraction and judgment. It signifies, not an absence, but a cessation, of effort. It is a sense
of joy and triumph, of pleasure in a form that has been discerned, admired, and loved
with a disinterested love,  the love which is  possible for formal structure.” (ATA 200;
original emphasis). But it is puzzling that at this point Eco has recourse to Pareyson and
not to Dewey, who in many contexts engaged this issue or the frameworks in which this
issue is discussed.
15 Eco cites a fine passage from Pareyson at this point, although he could have cited any
number of passages from Dewey. Here is the Pareyson passage:
Interpretation has two aspects. On the one hand, it is an active process intended to
grasp the true meaning of things, to fix the meaning in an image that is penetrating
and exhaustive, to give it a shape that is vigorous and adequate […] This process
tends toward a state of quietude in which it stops and rests; and this is, precisely,
the second aspect of interpretation. For on the other hand, interpretation means
quietude and stasis – the quiet discovery and success, the stasis of possession and
satisfaction […] The eye, which before this was sharpening its gaze, now just looks
and admires, intent, satisfied. It rests with pleasure upon the whole and upon its
parts, happy to have discovered the law of coherence which gathers everything into
a definite totality. It is contented at having understood the heart and nerve center
and the nature of  the breath which animates the form which it  has  put  to  the
question. (ATA 200, citing Estetica 161-2)
16 Eco draws a conclusion from this that the question of the aesthetic in Thomas Aquinas
“seems to have a paradoxical form […] in light of modern aesthetics” (ATA 200), although
it is not clear which part of modern aesthetics he is referring to. Intellectual knowledge,
he claims, is the generative matrix of Aquinas’s conception of the distinctively aesthetic
visio. Aquinas, Eco argues, takes beauty not to be the fruit of psychological empathy nor of
the imaginative transfiguration of the object – as if this polarity exhausts the alternatives.
Rather the roots of beauty for Aquinas are to be found deep in the knowledge of being.
“And so, intellectual travail is a necessary pathway to the knowledge of beauty.” (ATA
201).  This  comment  foreshadows  the  intellectual  turn  in  Eco’s  own  framing  of  the
discussion of aesthetics in A Theory of Semiotics, where the Deweyan focus on experiential
processes passes unnoticed and unexploited in favor of ‘high’ theory.
17 Aesthetic visio, for Aquinas, is, Eco rightly says, “an act in which I apprehend a formal
reality” (ATA 190).  For Aquinas,  Eco writes,  formal reality is  perceived precisely as a
structure (ATA 190) with a splendor and clarity for us who engage it. For Aquinas beauty
is “a state of equilibration between a perfect object and the intellect” (ATA 191, cited
after M. Febre, “Metafisica de la belleza,” Rivista de filosofia,  7, 1948, 91-134). Beauty is
apprehended when we contemplate formal structure in an ecstatic and fruitful moment
quieting other instrumental and existential urgencies. Eco here seemingly combines the
expository and the argumentative, since this is one of Dewey’s principal claims. Indeed, is
there not perhaps an echo of Dewey’s distinction between the art product and the art work
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in  Eco  statement  that  aesthetic  visio is  the  “aesthetic  actuation  of  an  ontological
perfection which was aesthetic only in potential” (ATA 191)?
18 What exactly is the aesthetic visio, clearly a theme posed by Eco on his own? It is neither
sensation  nor  pure  abstraction  but  rather  “apprehension  in  which  we  grasp  some
principle  of  organization  of  the  sensible.  Beauty  involves  both  form and  a  material
together”  (ATA 192).  Indeed,  while  “aesthetic  value is  rooted in  the  concreteness  of
things” (ATA 193) Eco remarks that within the limits of Aquinas’s philosophy there is no
“intuition of form in the sensible. In fact the scope for movement within his philosophy is
extremely  limited”  (ATA 194;  original  emphasis),  even  though Eco’s  first  allusion  to
Dewey as a gloss on Aquinas seems to indicate something else. Eco is striving, in spite of
himself, to show dynamic elements in Aquinas both on the level of interpretation and on
the  level  of  the  constitution  of  the  object  that  is  apprehended  aesthetically.  And
moreover, on Aquinas’s principles, there is some indirect knowledge of the singular by
reflection upon the phantasm (see pages 195-6 in ATA for Aquinas texts). Aquinas’s thesis,
as  formulated  by  Eco,  is  that  “aesthetic  seeing  does  not  occur  before  the  act  of
abstraction, nor in the act, nor just after it. It occurs instead at the end of the second
operation of the intellect – that is, in the judgment.” (ATA 196; original emphasis). 
19 The first operation of the intellect is  the apprehension of a quidditas,  an ‘essence’  or
‘quiddity,’  what a thing is to be. The grasp of properties, accidents, and relationships
incidental to the thing’s essence follow. The intellect, according to Aquinas, “accordingly
[…] must necessarily either combine one apprehension with another or separate them”
(ST I 85 54c). So, as Eco points out, we have as secondary originary acts of the intellect
operations  of  joining  and  separating,  the  marking  out  of  properties,  accidents,  and
contexts and, on the Scholastic principles of Aquinas, as Eco puts it, “it is only in the act
of judgment that I can determine whether a proportion measures up to my capacity to
experience it and to my psychological needs, and whether it also conforms with (say) the
laws of music and is adequate to what its nature demands” (ATA 198), hard as it is to
think of Aquinas speaking of ‘psychological needs.’ But, in a remarkable comment, Eco
writes  that  “every intellectual  endeavor  which culminates  in  judgment  has,  in  some
degree, an aesthetic outcome” (ATA 198), distinctive qualitative feel. 
20 As a matter of fact we can find parallel passages in Dewey that make the same points. And
clearly the effort of aesthetic abduction has the same type of outcome, as Peirce also
pointed out.  So,  it  is  an interesting question of  why Eco had subsidiary  recourse  to
Pareyson as a supporting text on the matter of the aesthetic visio and not the deeply
pragmatic approach exemplified in Dewey’s Art as Experience. 
21 How deep was his reading of Art as Experience at the time he was writing his Aquinas
book? This question is not meant so much as a criticism as noting a lost opportunity to
increase the sense of pragmatist linkages with materials that lay ready to hand and were
from time to time alluded to.
22 Consider, as examples, the following Dewey texts in light of the putative double operation
of the intellect in Aquinas and of Eco’s criticism of Maritain and the scholastics as to the
relationships between aesthetic visio and the nature of the links between abstraction,
interpretation, perception, and the swing and sway between activity and passivity in the
aesthetic encounter. Here is the first text:
We say with truth that a painting strikes us. There is an impact that precedes all
definite recognition of what it is about. As the painter Delacroix said about this first
and preanalytic phase, “before knowing what the picture represents you are seized
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by its magical accord.” This effect is particularly conspicuous for most persons in
music. The impression directly made by an harmonious ensemble in any art is often
described as the musical quality of that art. (AE 150)
23 The  second  text  ‘rotates’  the  theme  and  bears  upon  the  issue  of  combination  and
separation.
Even at the outset,  the total and massive quality has its uniqueness;  even when
vague  and  undefined,  it  is  just  that  which  it  is  and  not  something  else.  If  the
perception continues, discrimination inevitably sets in. Attention must move, and,
as it moves, parts, members, emerge from the background. And if attention moves
in  a  unified  direction  instead  of  wandering,  it  is  controlled  by  the  pervading
qualitative unity; attention is controlled by it because it operates within it. (AE 196;
original emphasis)
24 Eco’s  Aquinas  book  has  clearly  an  ambiguous  place  in  his  intellectual  career  and
especially in development of the aesthetic side of his later work. It has minimal explicit
references to Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics, although there are background resonances
in his analyses. Of special note is his minimizing the role of claritas in Aquinas. This is
strange in light of his claim about the importance of Dewey’s perceptual orienting of
aesthetics and of the emphasis on dynamic powers in Aquinas. To be sure, Eco intended
the Aquinas book to be an intellectual reconstruction, to place Aquinas correctly and
solidly in his time. At the same time his selective allusions to Dewey and to Pareyson
seem to follow,  albeit  schematically,  the same hermeneutic logic he was antipathetic
toward in the neo-scholastic appropriations of Aquinas. Eco offers us a compact summary
of the preceding discussion.
Let  us  take  stock.  The  beauty  of  an  object  is  identified,  in  Aquinas,  with  its
perfection, its fullness of being. It is the coefficient of this perfection that the object
be  subject  to  the  transcendental  law  of  proportion,  because  of  which  it  is  an
organism with a structure, and the structure corresponds to a particular order. In
its purely formal aspect – the aspect which is of interest in aesthetics – a perfect
object  is  an  object  which  has  integrity  and  proportion,  and  nothing  more  is
required. Its form is complete, ontologically ready to be judged beautiful. To speak
of the ‘resplendence’ of the form is simply a figure of speech for referring yet again
to integrity and proportion, the wholeness of which saturates and coordinates the
constituent parts. (ATA 119)
25 In fact,  the saturating and coordinating factor is  what Dewey called the unifying felt
quality of a work of art resident in its perceptual supports, giving it its resplendence.
When Eco remarks that “Scotist theory brings us to a new aesthetic world” (ATA 207)
with its foregrounding of haecceitas,  a notion that deeply influenced Hopkins and also
Joyce, and is clearly operative in Aquinas, one wonders why, as in the earlier pages, there
is such a hesitation to make further linkages. But it is clear that the Deweyan background,
while present, is faint in Eco’s first work.
 
3. Poetic Language as Exemplar: Transaction and
Expression
26 Dewey appears more extensively and explicitly in The Open Work,  first in the chapter,
‘Analysis of Poetic Language,’ in the opening section on Croce and Dewey, where Eco is
speaking in his own voice. The opening theme is the inner logic or aim of a work of art “to
be an inexhaustible source of experience” and to originate a continuous stream of new
aspects as it is engaged. It generates, ideally, “a series of meanings that expand at every
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new look” (OW 25). Croce, Eco remarks, thought of artistic representations as reflections
of the cosmos with a claim to a kind of totality such that it incorporates “the entire
drama of reality” (cited on p. 25) – clearly not explicitly in detail but in potentia with a
network of implications it gives rise to or can unfold without limit. This is the way, Eco
says, to understand Croce’s statement that “a true artistic representation is at the same
time itself and the universe, the universe as individual form, and the individual form as
universe” (cited on p. 25). The concentrated image embodies a feeling, Eco says, having a
distinctive quality, a ‘lyrical’ quality in Croce’s conception. But, Eco objects, Croce had no
theoretical framework with adequate philosophical tools to explain its nature. We have a
specific type of pleasure in undergoing the experience of the work of art but cannot
explain the mechanism that realizes it.
27 Eco then pivots to Dewey, who expressly had distinguished himself from Croce’s idealism.
Eco frames the issue as the “conditions of aesthetic pleasure” (OW 25) and the way of
explaining their mechanism. He foregrounds some well known central texts from Dewey’s
Art as Experience, although it is not clear that he is aware of their source in Dewey’s work,
namely  in  James’s  Principles  of  Psychology which  constantly  lurks  in  the  background.
Croce’s sense of a totality, Eco claims, refers to, in Dewey’s words (AE 198), “this sense of
the including whole implicit in ordinary experiences,” something also carried by a work
of art which is a meaningful whole or theme embedded in a field and enveloped by an aura
of resonances at the receding margin. Indeed, for Dewey, the focal and explicit objects of
the foreground of experience are surrounded, or accompanied, as Dewey says (AE 198), by
“a recession into the implicit which is not intellectually grasped. In reflection we call it
dim and vague,” qualities of an experience prior to what Eco calls, with hyperbole, the
“categorical rigidity imposed on us by reflection” (OW 25). Eco cites Dewey to the effect
that the essence of art lies in its power to evoke and emphasize “this quality of being a
whole and of belonging to the larger, all-inclusive, whole which is the universe in which
we live” and then,  perhaps alluding to one of  Dewey’s  own remarks,  that  there is  a
religious  dimension  inspired  in  us  by  aesthetic  contemplation.  But  it  is  a  religious
naturalism purged of supernaturalism and dogmatic certainties, a topic I have explored
before in some detail in my ‘The Reach of the Aesthetic and Religious Naturalism’ (Innis
2012).
28 In experience we are engaged in various modalities with only parts or sectors or regions
of the field, linked to, or lured toward, them by various interests that create what James
called the various ‘universes of meaning’ or ‘multiple realities’ that are extricated out of
the flux of experiencing by various acts of ‘abstraction.’  These interest structures are
embedded in, or even constituted by, what Dewey called ‘problematic situations’ that
initiate inquiry in the most general sense of that term. In any ‘situation,’ a technical term
in Dewey’s philosophy, “the undefined pervasive quality of an experience is that which
binds together all the defined elements, the objects of which we are focally aware, making
them a whole” (AE 198). The recognition of the theoretical centrality of this undefined
pervasive  quality  Dewey  considered  to  be  Peirce’s  most  important  philosophical
discovery. This theme I have discussed in my essay “The ‘Quality’ of Philosophy: On the
Aesthetic Matrix of Dewey’s Pragmatism” (Innis 2011).
29 Eco admits that Dewey’s aesthetics has naturalist, though not positivistic, foundations,
even though Eco hints  at  that  when he writes  that  “on the threshold of  the cosmic
mystery, Dewey seems to be afraid of taking the last step that would allow him to dissect
this  experience  of  the  indefinite  into  its  psychological  coordinates  and  declares  his
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failure” (OW 26). Here is the text he cites from Dewey: “I can see no psychological ground
for such properties of an experience save that, somehow, the work of art operates to
deepen and to raise to great clarity that sense of an enveloping undefined whole that
accompanies  every  normal  experience”  (AE  199),  a  position  derived  from  Dewey’s
appropriation of James’s theme-field-margin schema of the stream of consciousness. Eco
thinks Dewey gives up too quickly, that he had in fact already clarified the premises for
such an explanation in earlier pages of Art as Experience, but he strangely does not cite or
allude to these pages, one of which certainly contains the following passage.
We unconsciously carry over [a] belief in the bounded character of all objects of
experience (a belief founded ultimately in the practical exigencies of our dealings
with things) into our conception of experience itself. We suppose that experience
has  the  same definite  limits  as  the  things  with  which  it  is  concerned.  But  any
experience, the most ordinary, has an indefinite total setting. Things, objects, are
only focal points of a here and now in a whole which stretches out indefinitely. This
is the qualitative “background” which is defined and made definitely conscious in
particular objects and specified properties and qualities. (AE 197; original emphasis)
30 From the epistemological side, which is rooted in Dewey’s model of experiencing, Eco
characterizes  Dewey’s  theory  of  knowledge  as  transactional.  “Dewey  offers  us  a
transactional conception of knowledge that becomes particularly suggestive when set side
by side with his definition of the aesthetic object. The work of art, for him, is the fruit of a
process  of  organization  whereby  personal  experiences,  facts,  values,  meanings  are
incorporated  into  a  particular  material  and  become  one  with  it.”  (OW  27;  original
emphasis).  This  is  what  Dewey  called  ‘fundedness’  and  is  a  central  key  to  Dewey’s
approach to  expression,  which is  not  a  predominantly  ‘subjective’  process.  Eco  cites
Dewey to the effect that art is the “capacity to work a vague idea and emotion over into
terms  of  some  definite  medium”  (AE 82),  which  is,  in  the  later  semiotic  Eco,  the
expression plane. An art work’s expressive power, as Dewey put it, is dependent upon
“meanings and values extracted from prior experiences and funded in such a way that
they fuse with the qualities directly presented in the work of art” (AE 104). 
31 Eco’s apt citations of Dewey indicate that he is quite aware of the interlinking of Dewey’s
aesthetic concerns. Continuing with the theme of expression, which plays an important
role in A Theory of Semiotics, Eco cites the following text which contains in nuce the core of
Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics: 
[…]  the expressiveness  of  the object  of  art  is  due to  the fact  that  it  presents  a
thorough and  complete  interpenetration  of  the  materials  of  undergoing  and  of
action, the latter including a reorganization of matter brought with us from past
experience […] The expressiveness of the object is the report and celebration of the
complete fusion of what we undergo and what our activity of attentive perception
brings into what we receive by means of the senses. (AE 108)
32 As to ‘matter’ brought, from past experience, there is a footnote in which Eco cites Art as
Experience (AE 128), which in a way takes us back to the assimilation of mixed elements
notion in the Aquinas book: “[…] the scope of a work of art is measured by the number
and variety of elements coming from past experiences that are organically absorbed into
the perception had here and now.” This means that the work of art is defined by internal
relations,  making up a systematic whole,  but defined in perceptual  terms marked by
pertinence and relevance. Perception in this way becomes ‘thick’ in that we cannot just
pass through it to something else. It is marked by form. Eco cites the following text: “[…]
to have form […]  marks a  way of  envisaging,  of  feeling,  and presenting experienced
matter so that it most readily and effectively becomes material for the construction of
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adequate experience on the part of those less gifted than the original creator.” (AE 114).
In a text not cited by Eco Dewey claims that “form is a character of every experience that
is  an  experience  […]  Form may  then  be  defined  as  the  operation  of  forces  that  carry  the
experience of  an agent,  object,  scene,  and situation to its own integral  fulfillment .” (AE 142,
Dewey’s italics).
33 This  operation  of  forces  is  something  that  is  both  done  and  undergone,  a  delicate
balancing of activity and passivity that make up the poles of our encounters with the
world,  a  process  of  transactions  that  permeate  and fuse  both poles.  Knowledge,  Eco
writes, alluding beyond Art as Experience to “other texts by Dewey” (OW 27) which are not
cited, is a 
[…] difficult process of transaction, of negotiation: in answer to a given stimulus,
the subject incorporates the memory of past experiences into the current one and,
by so doing, gives form to the experience in progress – and experience that is not
only the recording of a Gestalt already existing as an autonomous configuration of
reality (or, for that matter, a subjective positing of the object), but that it is the
result of our active participation in the world, or, better yet, the world that results
from this active participation. Thus, the moment of totality (the experience of the
aesthetic moment as an openness of knowledge) could very well  lend itself  to a
psychological  explanation,  the absence of  which makes Croce’s  accounts,  and in
part Dewey’s, somewhat suspect. (OW 28)
34 Strangely enough, the first part of this text is almost a gloss on Dewey famous 1896 paper
on the ‘reflex arc’ as well as on Dewey’s paper on the “Does Reality Possess Practical
Character?” from the James Festschrift. These papers, especially the 1896 paper, inform
all  of  Dewey’s  later  work,  showing  experience  to  be  a  widening  gyre  of  doings  and
undergoings on multiple levels.  Eco shows,  however,  an implicit,  although somewhat
confused, affinity with the inner logic of Dewey’s work when he remarks that he (Eco) is
dealing with the “very conditions of knowledge, and not just the aesthetic experience,”
unless  he  adds,  aesthetic  experience  is  “the  liminal  condition  of  all  knowledge,  its
primary and essential phase, which is quite plausible but not exactly pertinent at this
stage of our investigation” (OW 28). But, as far as I can see, Eco progressively moved
toward a more explicitly ‘upper threshold’ framework that foregrounded cultural units,
the subject of semiotics, as the access points to the various forms of transaction and their
modelling,  including  aesthetic  transactions,  which  Dewey  very  emphatically  ‘pushed
down.’ In Kant and the Platypus he admitted, with reference to Innis (1994), that this ‘top
down’ approach, while clearly a valuable heuristic device in A Theory of Semiotics, could
perhaps not do full descriptive justice to the dynamic play of forms that make up the
experiential field. 
35 In the chapter, “Analysis of Poetic Language,” in The Open Work that is the focus of our
attention at this moment, Eco says that his investigation “will be limited to the process of
transaction between a perceiving subject and an aesthetic stimulus” and specifically to
the subject’s reaction to language as a paradigmatic artifact, the analysis of which can be
extended,  mutatis  mutandis,  to  other  art  forms.  Eco relies  on hints  from Jakobson to
distinguish the characteristics of aesthetic language and to abolish the absoluteness of the
distinction between the emotive and the referential use of language. Here I  can only
summarize Eco’s account, keeping the focus on its links with pragmatism in general and
Dewey  in  particular.  The  aesthetic  lessons  from  reflecting  on  language  as  aesthetic
stimulus is that the aesthetic stimulus is not purely referential. Its denotatum is global,
while the stimulus itself is composed of an integration of signifying components which do
The Lost Trail of Dewey
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-1 | 2018
10
not signify separately but belong to a field. “Form is perceived as a necessary, justified
whole  that  cannot  be  broken  […]  the  addressee  must  then  rely  on  his  capacity  to
apprehend the complex signification which the entire expression imposes on him. The
result is a multiform, plurivocal signified that leaves us at once satisfied and disappointed
with this first phase of comprehension precisely because of its indefiniteness.” (OW 36-7).
Eco speaks of a “harmonic background” of memories, perceptual habits, and so forth that
enters into “the chain reaction that characterizes every conscious organization of stimuli,
commonly known as ‘form’” (OW 37). Such a chain reaction is clearly not linear but more
a whorl of tendencies that catch us up and that are able to “stimulate certain zones of our
sensibility that previously remained untouched” (OW 38). Aesthetic value is not eternally
objective  and  immutable  or  immune to  transactional  processes,  whose  matrices  and
surrounding conditions are not able to be specified purely in aesthetic terms. “The truth
of the matter is that aesthetics is unable to give an exhaustive explanation of certain
aesthetic phenomena, even when it can allow for their plausibility. The task, then, falls to
psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics, and all those other sciences concerned
with cultural changes.” (OW 39). There is nothing in such a statement that contravenes a
pragmatist approach to aesthetics, especially as developed by Dewey.
36 Eco summarizes his argument in the following way, which exemplifies a grasp of deep
pragmatist principles:
The foregoing argument has, I hope, demonstrated that the impression of endless
depth, of all-inclusive totality – in short, of openness – that we receive from every
work of art is based on both the double nature of the communicative organization
of the aesthetic form and the transactional nature of the process of comprehension.
Neither openness nor totality is inherent in the objective stimulus, which is in itself
materially determined, or in the subject,  who is himself available to all  sorts of
openness and none; rather they lie in the cognitive relationship that binds them,
and in the course of which the object, consisting of stimuli organized according to a
precise aesthetic intention, generates and directs various kinds of openness. (OW
39)
37 That is, generates a spiral of interpretants on the affective, actional, and ideational levels.
But Eco makes no reference to these dimensions in Dewey, which mirror the Peircean
schema, without explicitly citing them.
 
4. Aesthetic Value and Two Kinds of Openness
38 Openness for Eco is the very condition of aesthetic pleasure (OW 39). This pleasure on
Deweyan grounds is the felt  outcome arising from a sense of completion, of having an
experience  that  is  satisfying  in  itself  and  intrinsically  meaningful,  apart  from
instrumental contexts. Clearly, Eco asserts, the multi-leveled structure of an art work
shows that it cannot be “a univocal, unambiguous communication” (OW 39). Multimodal
plurisignification is inherent in the aesthetic stimulus and is ‘realized’ in the transaction.
Dewey speaks of the art product becoming the art work in the experience of the perceiver
or  interpreter.  In  this  sense  all  aesthetic  stimuli  are  ‘open,’  just  as  all  processes  of
semiosis are open. If, on Peircean grounds, we really believe that consciousness is a chain
of signs generating a complex trail of interpretants, all sign configurations are ‘open.’
They are ‘realized’ in accord with the forms of interpretants to which they give rise:
affective,  energetic,  and  logical,  to  use  what  is  perhaps  Peirce’s  most  basic and
aesthetically relevant analytical schema. There is, moreover, a ‘rich’ ambiguity that is
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grounded in the material embodiment of the art work and a ‘weak’ ambiguity that comes
from mere confusion, lack of clarity or structure. 
39 At the same time Eco admits that “semantic plurality is not enough to determine the
aesthetic value of a work” (OW 41), a remark made with reference to Joyce but clearly
extendible to other non-linguistic art forms. Indeed, while speaking of Finnegans Wake,
although with wider implications, Eco states the ambiguity of the signs in an art work
“cannot be separated from their aesthetic organization:  rather,  the two are mutually
supportive and motivating” (OW 40).  The ‘total organization of the art work’ in Eco’s
consideration is the determinant of the “density of its resonance and its provocative
power” and not just its “semantic plurality” (OW 41) when we are dealing with an open
work or the desire to create one. Such a plurality is dependent upon a “background of
references and suggestions, thereby increasing their echoes” (OW 42). This is the fringe
or margin constituting part of the Deweyan ‘fundedness’ that marks the forestructures of
all  experiential  transactions  and  especially  those  with  deliberately  plurivocal
communicational intent. Incorporation into the “right form” is necessary to engender the
“fundamental openness proper to all successful artistic forms” (OW 42), including the
openness resulting from our experiences of  being interrupted by ordered forms that
show themselves ‘strange’ to our antecedent systems of expectations. Eco picks up this
dimension in A Theory of Semiotics. Order introduces disorder in order to introduce new
forms of order. Indeed, a pragmatist aesthetics would make this process a basic principle
for the development of consciousness, with no intent of discarding previous forms of
order.  They  remain  ordered  contexts  that  present  permanent  possibilities  of
reexperiencing by being informed by the later experience of otherwise structured and
ordered forms. Fundedness leads to and grounds a ‘fusion.’
40 Disorder in communication is disorder, then, only in relation to a previous order (OW 58),
where the “quotient of imagination” embodied in a ‘disordering form’ is its aesthetic
measure and source of its novelty. When Eco speaks of the “full resonance of the poetic
word” such an expression does not apply just to poetry, but to the experiential plenitude
or fullness of the aesthetic form, including, it must be admitted, the elegant brevity of a
Haiku or miniatures of all sorts, examples also used by Dewey. A pragmatist aesthetics,
rooted in perception, clearly recognizes, along with Eco, Moles’s notion of a difference
threshold crossed by a novel art work, a difference registered first of all in the sense of a
novel quality with dynamic tendency, a tendency toward “controlled disorder, toward a
circumscribed potential  […]  the  germ of  formativity  present  in  any form that  wants  to
remain open to the free choice of the addressee” (OW 65; original emphasis), grasped in a
dialectics of oscillation that establishes transactional rapport.
41 Transactional rapport “constitutes the very processes of perception and reasoning” (OW
71) whose openness can be extended to “every perceptual and intellectual process” (OW
71). Such processes occur in stages and highlight aspects of their engaged field “that lend
themselves to an interaction with the dispositions of the subject” (OW 71), dispositions of
multiple kinds: affective, behavioral, conceptual/logical. Eco states that art deliberately
provokes “incomplete experiences” so as to arouse “our natural craving for completion”
(OW 74),  which Dewey saw epitomized in our grasp of art and in forms of attending
outside of instrumental contexts. The natural craving for completion is prolonged by the
rich ambiguity and informational fullness of a work of art that counteracts psychic inertia
and its promise of a recovered order instead of the pressing task of engaging a new order,
which takes its place alongside other orders,  challenging,  modifying,  enriching them.
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According to Eco we are in the case of the explicitly open work not so much concerned
with a prediction of the expected as with an expectation of the unpredictable. This should be
seen as a kind of aesthetic pragmatic maxim, but, in light of a pragmatist aesthetics, it is
not restricted to the types of art works foregrounded and engaged by Eco.
42 Eco in The Open Work was clearly caught between his own philosophical transitions and
perplexities and a search for analytical means to resolve them, whether in a relatively
randomized appropriation of certain elements from Dewey’s Art as Experience and maybe
other absorbed but not cited Dewey articles or elements from the contemporary post-
Gestalt tradition in psychology that supported the transactional psychology he thought
needed to underpin an aesthetics that recognized the implications of the concept of the
open work. For Eco “only a psychology concerned with the genesis of structures can
justify this  tendency of  contemporary art” (OW 80-1),  namely,  of  enjoying “both the
equiprobability of all the systems and the openness of the process as a whole” (OW 80).
Indeed, “[…] today’s psychology seems to pursue its explorations in precisely the same
directions taken by the poetics of the open work” (81). The open work is a concept fully
consonant  with  a  pragmatist  aesthetics,  which  views  art  works  and  the  aesthetic
dimensions  of  experience  as  spiraling  out  of  the  various  ‘vortices  of  consciousness’
marking Dewey’s ‘live creature’s’ involvement with the world. 
43 Eco’s  psychological  resources  reconstitute  in  slightly  different  terms  the  descriptive
framework  informing  Dewey’s  Art  as  Experience.  He  appropriates  the  conceptions  of
fluctuation,  of  perception as a commitment in which a percept is  “none other than a
temporary stabilization of a sensible configuration,” “a fluctuating perceptual  whole”
which has attained a “right form” (OW 81). Dewey had stated that one of the functions of
art is to show that objects must not have or be assumed to have stable properties and that
art explores the lability of forms, the various forms of appearing, what Eco called “the
very perishability of all patterns and all schemes” (OW 83). On Deweyan terms it is not
just contemporary art that is to be seen as, as Eco puts it, “fulfilling a precise pedagogical
function, a liberating role” (OW 83). Dewey ascribes this function to art itself in all its
forms. The discourse of contemporary art that Eco takes as the paradigm of breaking free
of the closed world of classical and modern art is not alone in its efforts “to represent
modern man’s path to salvation, toward the recognition of his lost autonomy at the level
of both perception and intelligence” (OW 83). Art as Experience shows on practically every
page that a fully developed experiential approach to art underlies all forms of art when
the encrusted layers of mere perceptual and affective habits are broken through and
experience is allowed to follow its dynamic toward novelty,  following the upsurge of
world process itself. 
44 So  Eco  is  right  in  The  Open  Work to  emphasize,  as  pragmatist  aesthetics  does,  the
perceptual matrices in which the aesthetic encounter takes place. The encounter involves
on  both  the  creative  and  the  experiential  side  grouping  into  specific  forms,  the
unification of experiences that are unfolding in time on both the individual and social
levels. He brings Dewey back into the discussion by citing one passage of Dewey: “We
have an experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment. Then
and only then is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience
from other experiences […] In an experience, flow is from something to something.” (AE
42-3; original emphasis). Dewey does not think, no more than Aquinas does, that we can
live our lives in a constant state of experiential fulfillment, an unbroken sequence of ‘an 
experiences.’ Being absorbed in an art work or in an experience of nature punctuates
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everydayness in a way that a mountain range arises from a plain. ‘An experience’ is a
contrast term  as  well  as  an  evaluative term,  but  it  is  not  meant  to  characterize  all
experiences such that its everyday instrumental  character would be found lacking in
value. But it is also the case that certain dominating structures of everydayness block the
possibilities of having experiences run their course to fulfillment, precisely the criticism
Dewey made of the excesses of industrial capitalism and its savaging of the environment,
both urban and natural,  individual  and social.  What Eco writes about plot  applies to
Dewey’s point: it is “the search for, and the establishment of, a coherence, a unity, an
order in the midst of chaotic diversity” (OW 111).
45 Eco  writes  that  “clearly,  what  we  find  most  interesting  in  Dewey’s  definition  of
experience is not so much the organic nature of the process (the interaction between the
subject  and  its  surroundings)  as  its  formal  aspect:  the  fact  that  he  sees  it  as  an
accomplishment, a fulfillment” (OW 111; original emphasis). This is not quite right. Eco gives
the impression that an experience is something that we do, that it is an achievement due
to effort and can be produced by thematic control. However, one of the central themes of
Dewey’s aesthetics is the undergoing side, the being caught up in a process that is not
something that we do. There is rather an emergent quality on the receptive side to such
an experience in that it confronts us and engages us, even against our will. In fact, on
Dewey’s account, it is the constant interlinking of undergoing and doing that marks the
dynamic spiraling circuit of behavior, a Deweyan echo in Eco’s discussion. This involves
constant adjustment. On the creative side Dewey is also insistent on the emergent nature
of the form that arises from the various resistances that the medium puts up. The notion
of resistance also marks the secondness that confronts us, marking a kind of degree of
difficulty, although Dewey does not explicitly use Peircean terminology at this point in
his  aesthetic  theory.  Rather,  he  reconstitutes  and  exemplifies  it,  with  nuance  and
descriptive thickness, as I have shown in “Dewey’s Peircean Aesthetics” (Innis 2014). 
 
5. Linking Dewey to Form as Social Commitment
46 Eco also engages Dewey in the chapter “Form as Social Commitment” in The Open Work
where the opening theme deals with the double-faced nature of alienation. His discussion
involves a serious, maybe even inexplicable, misunderstanding of Dewey’s point even if
the theme was also central to Dewey’s aesthetic critique of modern social forms, as I have
examined in a chapter on the pragmatist critique of technology in my Pragmatism and the
Forms of Sense (Innis 2002). As to alienation, Eco follows the lead of the difference and
polarity between the two German words, Entfremdung and Verfremdung as residing in the
consequences of the universal process of objectification understood in the differently
weighted senses given to that term in Hegel and Marx. Alienation ‘in’  the objectified
world  implies  a  self-renunciation,  a  becoming ‘other’  in  a  world  of  objects  that  one
oneself has made and being made ‘subject’ to its powers. Alienation ‘from’ the objectified
world means that one cannot see oneself in such a world, treating it as external to us, an
evil, even if necessary, that we have to contend with but with the hope that ultimately we
can ‘wash our hands of it’ by some way of destroying it. So we have alienation as self-loss
or self-absorption in an objectified world and alienation as critical self-distancing from
the objectified world with the hope or expectation of dominating it whether by one’s own
actions or some external intervention. 
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47 It within the focus of the kind of alienation attendant upon every act of objectification
that Eco introduces references to Dewey’s Art as Experience into the analysis. Eco thinks
there is a permanent tension involved in the Hegelian/Marxist notion of alienation ‘in’ an
object or object world, a tension that can be eliminated “both in action and awareness,
but not forever” (OW 127). As a matter of fact there is a Hegelian background to the web
of  concerns  that  informs  Dewey’s  philosophical  project  and  also  a  bearing  on  the
dichotomy of (a) the beautiful soul and (b) “the subject’s joyful dissolution in the object”
(131). Embodiment in objects, the extension of corporeality into object is, Eco rightly says,
the “very condition of homo faber” (132). Indeed, Dewey writes in Art as Experience (AE 286)
that “the self is created in the creation of objects” and moreover “in every experience we
touch the world through some particular tentacle; we carry on our intercourse with it, it
comes home to us, through a specialized organ” (AE 199) with each medium having its
own efficacy and value and also different effects upon the acting subject. 
48 So, it is strange that Eco thinks that Dewey is at the opposite extreme of the beautiful
soul’s refusal to get its hands dirty. He wrongly ascribes to Dewey the position that the
integration of man and nature can be full, so that there is exuded a putatively universal
“feeling of harmony and fulfillment” (133). Here is the text he cites from Dewey: 
Every  experience  is  the  result  of  interaction  between a  live  creature  and some
aspect of the world in which he lives. A man does something: he lifts, let us say, a
stone. In consequence, he undergoes, suffers something: the weight, strain, texture
of the surface of the thing lifted. The properties thus undergone determine further
doing.  The  stone  is  too  heavy  and  too  angular,  not  solid  enough;  or  else  the
properties undergone show it is fit for the use for which it is intended. The process
continues until a mutual adaptation of the self and the object emerges and that
particular experience comes to a close […] [The] interaction of the two constitutes
the total experience that is had, and the close which completes it is the institution
of a felt harmony. (AE 50)
49 The next paragraph gives Eco’s gloss, which is woefully inadequate and misleading. Eco
writes: “The tragic suspicion that a relationship with an object may fail precisely because
it succeeds too much is absent from Dewey’s philosophy. For Dewey, an experience can
fail (that is, fail to be a full-fledged experience) only when between the person and the
object there is a polarity that cannot be resolved by integration; when there is integration
there  is  experience,  and an  experience  can only  be  positive.”  (OW 134).  But  in  fact
Dewey’s position is quite otherwise.
50 Dewey’s text is normative, not descriptive. Felt harmony with self and other is the goal of
human experience in its  individual  and social  forms,  but  Dewey’s  aesthetics  with its
distinction  between  normal  experience  and  an experience  presupposes  that  the
ineluctable resistances that mark our lives in a world filled with peril  and perpetual
perishing can never be permanently overcome.  The ideal  is  not total  integration – a
utopian phantasy – but the institution of frameworks and matrices of perception and
action  that  correspond  to  the  constraints  of  our  lives  in  time.  Dewey  is  neither
unrealistically optimistic nor depressingly pessimistic but rather, in line with pragmatist
principles, melioristic. He is not fearful that embodiment leads inevitably to alienation. 
51 Here are two texts  where the double  tendency in Dewey’s  ‘aesthetic  critique’  of  the
technological world is exemplified. The first text has a positive tone.
Where the worker produces in different industrial  conditions from those which
prevail today, his own impulsions tend in the direction of creation of articles of use
that satisfy his urge for experience as he works. It seems to me absurd to suppose
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that  preference  for  mechanically  effective  execution  by  means  of  a  completely
smoothly  running  mental  automatisms,  and at  the  expense  of  quickened
consciousness of what he is about, is ingrained in psychological structure. And if
our environment, as far as it is constituted by objects of use, consisted of things
that are themselves contributory to a heightened consciousness of sight and touch,
I do not think any one would suppose that the act of use is such as to be anesthetic.
(AE 266-7)
52 The second text has a more critical tone.
The mechanical stands at the pole opposite to that of the esthetic, and production
of goods is now mechanical. The liberty of choice allowed to the craftsman who
worked  by  hand  has  almost  vanished  with  the  general  use  of  the  machine.
Production of objects enjoyed in direct experience by those who possess, to some
extent, the capacity to produce useful commodities expressing values, has become a
specialized matter apart from the general run of production. This fact is probably
the most important factor in the status of art in present civilization. (AE 344)
53 So, in one sense, while Eco is right to speak of “ascetic” stratagems “to safeguard my
freedom while implicating myself in the object” (135), maybe the best formulation of his
point would be ‘aesthetic’ stratagems, not just to protect oneself from the consequences
of embodiment but to further and control its processes. 
54 This is precisely what Dewey proposed. Embodiment is double process of self-formation
and  world-formation.  When  Eco  writes  that  “every  successful  form  rests  on  the
unconscious translation of amorphous matter into a human dimension” (OW 156), we can
read this is light of his and Dewey’s foregrounding of form on all levels of our existence.
In this sense ‘form as social commitment’ is an essential linking notion that connects
Eco’s analytical mode, even if only implicitly, to one of the most fundamental principles
of Dewey’s aesthetics and political theory.
55 What Eco says about avant-garde poetics is paradoxically also the task carried out by
Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics: to “provide us with the imaginative categories necessary
to move more easily in this world” (OW 150).  Both argue that the continuous flux of
existence and the ‘sea of objectivity’ (Calvino) cannot be met with passive adherence or
be opposed by relying on an uncritical “ideal human standard of measurement” (OW 150).
The new human standard of measurement, which Eco saw needed, is precisely the model
grounded in the tracing,  with an aesthetically normative eye,  of  the development of
forms of experiencing which Dewey aimed at, exploiting James’s insights and also Peirce’s
theory of quality. Speaking of the flux of existence with its emergent islands of order of
various sorts is,  as both Eco and Dewey would agree, already to begin to judge it.  In
judgment  we  alienate  ourselves  from it  and  as  a  result  “take  the  first  step  toward
repossessing it” (OW 151). 
56 Eco, as would perhaps be expected, sees literature as an especially powerful means of
expressing “our relationship to the object of our knowledge, and our concern with the
form we have given the world, or the form we have failed to give it” (OW 157). Eco says
about  the  artistic  process  quite  generally  that  it  “tries  to  give  form  to  disorder,
amorphousness,  and dissociation.”  It  is  “the  effort  of  a  reason that  wants  to  lend a
discursive  clarity  to  things”  (OW  157),  which  aesthetics,  as  an  analytical  discipline
operating  in  the  mode  of  theory  and  not  exemplification,  also  achieves.  Dewey,  a
persistent searcher for discursive clarity, writes in the chapter on ‘Art and Civilization’ in
Art as Experience in a passage that could have been written by Eco:
Words furnish a record of what has happened and give direction by request and
command to particular future actions. Literature conveys the meaning of the past
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that is significant in present experience and is prophetic of the larger movements
of the future. Only imaginative vision elicits the possibilities that are interwoven
within the texture of the actual. (AE 348)
57 The development of Eco’s semiotics gives an implicit primacy to language and literature
and indeed Dewey himself is in agreement, though Eco makes no references to Dewey on
this subject. Dewey, for his part, writes that “the art of literature […] works with loaded
dice;  its  material  is  charged with meanings they have absorbed through immemorial
time. Its material thus has an intellectual force superior to any other art, while it equals
the capacity of architecture to present the values of collective life.” (AE 244). 
58 The ‘loaded dice’ of literature and of the languages that support it is another one of the
parallels  and  links  between  Dewey  and  Eco  and  clearly,  independently  of  Dewey’s
compact and rich discussion of literature, a major source of Eco’s notion of the open work
and then later of the infinite semiosis engendered in the processes of sign production in
general and texts in particular.  These topics are systematically explored with mature
Peircean tools in the section, ‘Peirce Alone,’ in the chapter on ‘Unlimited Semiosis and
Drift’  in  The  Limits  of  Interpretation.  There Eco notes  that  Peirce’s  synechism with its
principle of ontological continuity means that there is always a further determination of
the perceptual and other continuums, including the great continuum of language, whose
richnesses  are  explored  and  exploited  by  Joyce  and  celebrated  in  The  Aesthetics  of
Chaosmos. 
59 But after The Open Work the trail of Dewey in Eco’s work becomes very faint and marginal.
There are references to a transactional account of perception in Kant and the Platypus
which I mentioned earlier. There is one at least third hand reference, through Putnam, to
James’s  contention  that  “knowledge  of  facts  presupposes  knowledge  of  theories,
knowledge of theories presupposes knowledge of facts.” The references to Peirce make up
almost a half column in the index of Kant and the Platypus and are strewn throughout the
text but clearly involved in Eco’s return to the problem of iconism. But Kant and the
Platypus has minimal aesthetic relevance and even less to determining Eco’s relation to
pragmatism.  He  is  speaking  to  a  quite  different  audience  and  with  quite  different
resources.  Still,  in  concluding  this  examination  of  key  aspects  of  Eco’s  relation  to
pragmatism, it is necessary to look, albeit briefly, at the section on ‘Aesthetic Text as
Invention’ in A Theory of Semiotics to see whether in this pivotal work of Eco taking up the
lost trail of Dewey could have enriched and maybe even reconfigured this ‘breviarium
aestheticum’ that nevertheless still  remains of heuristic value for understanding both
Eco’s  aesthetic  framework,  clearly  semiotic,  and  its  relation  to  Dewey’s  pragmatist
approach. 
 
6. Pragmatist Dimensions of the Aesthetic Text as
Invention
60 Eco clearly formulates the general matrix of his approach to aesthetics in A Theory of
Semiotics by exploiting the notion of  ‘text,’  a  distinctively semiotic  theme.  There are
nevertheless illuminating points of intersection between his schema and Dewey’s model
of aesthetic experience. Eco’s hope is that such a semiotic approach to ‘aesthetic texts’
may help to throw light on “many problems that traditional philosophical aesthetics has
left  unsolved”  (TS  261).  He  does  not  specify  what  he  means  by  the  blanket  term
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‘traditional,’  which Dewey’s  experience-grounded and explicitly  pragmatist  aesthetics
definitely is not. 
61 Eco  returns  in  A  Theory  of  Semiotics  to  Jakobson’s  well-known  foregrounding  of  the
ambiguous and self-focusing nature of the sign-configurations of poetic language. Eco
follows, as we have seen, Jakobson’s claim that ambiguity arises from violating the rules
of  the  code,  including  forms  of  stylistic  ambiguity,  in  that  an  expression  can  be
‘grammatical’ yet not ‘normal.’ Ambiguity, on Eco’s account, can “function as a sort of
introduction to the aesthetic experience” (TS 263). It does not produce more disorder or
confusion but urges or stimulates an interpretive effort (actually, it involves ‘difficulty’)
in that it ‘resists’ us, clearly a hermeneutic manifestation of Peircean secondness. While
Dewey, as he remarks in his 1946 essay, ‘Peirce’s Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought, and
Meaning,’ does not find the Peircean theory of categories a ‘happy’ one, he does recognize
felt resistance as a multi-leveled factor in the art work that interrupts us and blocks our
passing through it  to  something else.  Resistance on the aesthetic  plane involves  the
material ‘thickening’ of the sign-configuration or the breaking of an interpretive habit,
which may not be able to be systematically controlled or even formulated. 
62 Ambiguity on the expression plane entails ambiguity on the content plane. Eco follows
the Russian formalists in arguing that there is beyond the felt sense of resistance a shock¸ 
a feeling of a break, such that the receiver of the aesthetic message is forced to reconsider
“the  entire  organization  of  the  content”  (TS  263).  Dewey’s  pragmatist  aesthetics
recognizes  this  aesthetic  as  well  as  existential  phenomenon:  that  art  works  ‘make
strange’ and, in instances of the sublime, elicit a sense of bewilderment by increasing “the
difficulty and the duration of perception” (TS 264, citing Viktor Shklovsky 1917), an apt
characterization of one of Dewey’s fundamental principles. Just as a deep quarrel with an
old friend can force us to reconsider a lifetime of closeness, the encounter with art works
can do the same. Dewey saw art as wiping away the film that covers objects and episodes
and making us see them as if for the first time, creating a particular perception through
the art work as revealing that the perception of objects is always an ‘open’ process that
both stabilizes forms of perception through the material configuration of the art work
and destabilizes them by revealing new properties and aspects. But it is to the formalists
that Eco turns here and not to Dewey and the pragmatists. The Deweyan phenomenology
of  experience,  with  its  roots  in  James  and  Peirce,  offers  us  important  ways  of
understanding the phenomenon that the formalists developed from a rather different
angle.
63 Without mentioning Dewey Eco foregrounds the centrality of rhythm and of rhythmic
violations, a topic central to Dewey’s analysis of aesthetic experience. Eco once again
follows Victor Shklovsky: “aesthetic rhythm consists of a prosaic rhythm that has been
violated […] it is a question not of complex rhythm but of violation of that rhythm and of
a violation such that it cannot be predicted; if violation becomes the rule, it loses the
force that it had as an operational obstacle.” (Shklovsky 1917; cited TS 264). It is precisely
the violation of the expected, a break in background rhythm that makes the art work
(text) become self-focusing, with a rhythm of its own, and thereby “directs the attention
of the addressee primarily to its own shape” (TS 264; original emphasis), that is, its form. 
64 As to the role of rhythm, Dewey writes, “Esthetic rhythm is a matter of perception and
therefore includes whatever is contributed by the self in the active process of perceiving”
(AE 167-8), that is, it is a funded process, rooted in the body. It is an “ordered variation of
energy” and “variation is  not  only  as  important  as  order,  but  it  is  an indispensable
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coefficient of esthetic order” (AE 169). Rhythm is “rationality among qualities” (AE 174), a
form of aesthetic rationality. Indeed, “art operates by selecting those potencies in things
by which an experience – any experience – has significance and value […] Order, rhythm
and balance, simply means that energies significant for experience are acting at their
best.” (AE 189). Rhythmic crises quite generally punctuate “the stream of living” (AE 12),
destabilizing  and  unbalancing.  Art  and  aesthetic  experience  further  processes  of
stabilizing and balancing while also introducing movement away from the encrustations
of habit. Rather than reifying art, Dewey holds that “art is a quality that permeates an
experience; it is not, save by a figure of speech, the experience itself. Esthetic experience
is always more than aesthetic. In it a body of matters and meanings, not in themselves
aesthetic,  become esthetic  as  they enter  into an ordered rhythmic movement toward
consummation.” (AE 329; original emphasis). At no point in his discussion of aesthetics in
A Theory of Semiotics does Eco allude to Dewey’s ideas about rhythm, although Dewey is
listed in the bibliography of Trattato generale di semiotic but not in A Theory of Semiotics. At
the same time Eco says nothing that contravenes the thrust of Dewey’s work and his brief
foregrounding of it  is a motivation to investigate what a semiotic aesthetics,  with its
emphasis on sign-configurations, can contribute to the study of rhythm. Dewey’s absence
at this point in Eco’s discussion provokes reflection on his claim about the important
influence of his reading of Art as Experience.
65 As to the fundamental  role the “lower levels of  the expression plane” play in art and
aesthetic  experience  (TS  264;  original  emphasis),  they  deserve,  Eco  says,  a  semiotic
explanation,  themes  taken  up  in  Kant  and  the  Platypus but  with  minimal  aesthetic
discussion. Here Eco opens up the important issues of prethematic microstructures, inner
textures of materials, qualitative feels, and senses of pertinence and salience that inform
and constitute a “whole series of hypostructures” (original emphasis) which clearly exist
on the perceptual stratum. James and Dewey would have been of great help here,  as
would  others  working  out  of  different  traditions,  such  as  Polanyi’s  account  of  tacit
knowing and subsidiary awareness, which I have discussed elsewhere. Eco speaks of how
we are to conceive the “unshaped continuum” as being structured into a set of cultural
units segmented by a kind of syntactic system that gives rise to a “structured set of
signal-units” (TS 266). As he conceives it, “the stuff of which the sign-vehicle is made is
the continuum from which the expression form has cut out its expression units” (TS 266).
Dewey’s great rich and dense chapters on the ‘substances’ of the arts bears directly on
this whole domain, which Eco formulates primarily with the help of Hjelmslev’s schemas.
66 However, such a way of putting it seems to imply that this involves an action on the
expression form rather than the expression form itself emerging out of the artist’s striving
to find an appropriate support of what one wants to express. The continuum itself has
expressive possibilities that ‘fit’ the content, having a kind of ‘rightness’ or ‘affinity.’ This
appears to be the point of Dewey’s masterful reflections on the mediums or ‘substances’
of the various arts, their material underpinnings. But, even on the semiotic level, is there
not some danger of speaking of “expression units” as if they could make up some sort of
‘vocabulary’? At the same time Eco is certainly right when he claims that “in the aesthetic
text the matter of the sign-vehicle becomes an aspect of the expression-form” (TS 266; original
emphasis), informed by what Peirce called its material quality. A task for a pragmatist
semiotic approach to the aesthetic is to explore how far down the field of hypoforms goes
within the domain of ‘significations,’ especially ‘affective’ significations. Eco also does not
advert  to  the  notions  of  an  aura,  fringe,  and  so  forth  that  Dewey,  following  James,
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explored, notions that permeate Art as Experience. He gestures toward microstructures,
but his basis is far from the analytical tools derived from pragmatism. Although he is
right to admit ‘lower levels’ of signification and communication, he has constant recourse
to linguistic examples. Should he not be talking about a pre-thematic field of habits of
attending that  shift  according to  apprehended centers  and arrays  of  pertinence  and
salience that he discussed in all too brief fashion in Kant and the Platypus?
67 As to the question of what type of relation exists between “the further segmentation of
the token matter of a given sign-vehicle and the further segmentation of the expression plane
of an entire semiotic system” (TS 268; original emphasis), Eco rightly considers this a
process of pertinentization “of those aspects of the expression-continuum that have up to
now been considered as ‘hyposemiotic stuff’” (TS 268).  A pragmatist aesthetics would
certainly agree that “a work of art performs a semiotic redemption of its basic matter”
(TS 268) and does so by a process of infinite pertinentization, a process recognized by
Dewey and James and indeed is implicit in Peirce’s theses on indeterminacy, including
perceptual indeterminacy. Eco strangely claims that “as long as semiotics continues to
develop, the continuum will be further segmented and therefore better understood: the
aesthetic experience provides a special opportunity for increasing this understanding”
(TS  269;  original  emphasis).  Surely  it  is  semiosis,  including  aesthetically  pivotal
perceptually  focused  semiosis,  that  continues  to  develop,  with  semiotics  being  the
reflection upon its processes. Analysis of processes of semiosis such as aesthetic semiosis
are second order processes. The task is to find the appropriate set of broadly pragmatist
analytical  categories that are able to encompass the tension between perception and
semiosis in the aesthetic dimension of life. It may be asked whether Eco ever satisfactorily
gave  an  account  of  this  matter.  I  have  discussed  elsewhere  ways  of  doing  this  (see
references).
68 For Eco the well-known surplus of expression is paralleled on the part of the addressee by
a vaguely sensed surplus of content, a surplus still aroused even when the surplus of
expression is not “consciously grasped” (TS 270). Eco admits that one might be tempted
to  think  that  a  work  of  art  communicates  too  much  and  as  consequence  does  not
communicate at all, casting as a result a magic spell “that is radically impermeable to all
semiotic approach” (TS 270). Eco retorts:
[…] a work of art has the same structural characteristics as does a langue. So that it
cannot  be  a  mere  ‘presence’;  there  must  be  an  underlying  system  of  mutual
correlations, and thus a semiotic design which cunningly gives the impression of
non-semiosis. (TS 271; original emphasis)
69 Eco writes that the art work as structure of mutual correlations has achieved “a new
status  as  a  super  sign-function”  (TS  271;  original  emphasis).  I  think  that  Dewey’s
perception-based  organic  notion  of  an  art  work  with  mutual  levels  and  systems  of
interacting energies also recognizes many underlying systems of mutual correlations, but
the reference to langue shows Eco’s commitment to an underlying semiotic model based
on language and the notion of a text. Such a model, while suggestive, is not sufficient and
even  Eco  refers  to  “structural  characteristics”  rather  than  affirming  that  art  works
belong to language-like systems. Art works can be, and certainly, are sign-configurations,
but they do not rely on coded systems of differential markers in the way language-like
systems do. Dewey’s aesthetic model is complemented richly by such a model as Susanne
Langer  developed,  which  bound  together  feeling,  perception,  and  signification  in  a
powerful account of the genesis and nature of an art work.
The Lost Trail of Dewey
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-1 | 2018
20
70 Peirce and Dewey show that it is the qualitative uniqueness of every work of art that gives
rise to and support its array of appropriate interpretants. This is in fact a process of
abduction, accompanied by a kind of hypothetical tension, felt as a distinctive quality,
aroused, for example, by a piece of music, but also possessed by all art works in different
degrees. Eco writes that there occurs in the aesthetic encounter a ‘release’ of a “strong
and complex feeling” (TS 274) but also a sense of being engaged, even opposed, by an
‘other’ that is communicating some ‘sense’ to us. So, Eco is right to say that art produces
further  knowledge and does  not  merely  elicit  an arbitrary set  of  individual  feelings.
Affective interpretation means recognizing not just how one is affected but whether one’s
feeling-response is appropriate to the form (perhaps an echo of the remarks about music in
Eco’s discussion of music in Aquinas). In the aesthetic encounter we are pulled into a
game of intertwined interpretations and accompanying experiences, as I have discussed
elsewhere (Innis 2007). We are pulled ‘inside’ the art work to dwell in it, being caught up
in it  through progressive processes  of  apprehending and differentiating the material
qualities  and the  resultant  ‘tone’  of  the  work.  An art  work  makes  us aware  of  new
semiosic  possibilities  and  trains  not  just  semiosis  at  the  upper  levels  but  the  lower
thresholds of experience itself out which art emerges as the transfiguration of matter
into sense. 
71 Eco writes: “Like a large labyrinthine garden, a work of art permits one to take many
different routes, whose number is increased by the criss-cross of its paths.” (TS 275). Eco
is right to follow Peirce in arguing that all forms of inference are in play in the ‘reading’
or ‘perceiving’  of an artwork and that aesthetic abduction,  in one sense,  “consists in
proposing certain tentative codes in order to make the author’s message understandable”
(TS 275). But a pragmatist aesthetics, such as developed by Dewey against the background
of James and Peirce, with its focus on constructive experiential participation in the play
of elements both broadens and diminishes the notion of code to one of differentiated
systems  of  interpretive  habits  on  the  affective,  actional,  and  ideational  levels  both
personally and socially. These make up the schema of ‘forestructures’ or dimensions of
the aesthetic encounter and correspond to the schema of Peircean interpretants. They
are ‘filled’ or ‘generated’ in the actual encounter, where there is always a permanent
tension between fidelity and freedom (TS 276), a tension exemplified in the ‘open work’
but constitutive of all art works that reveal new thresholds of sense. 
72 We walk in the labyrinthine garden of art, and we follow a variety of paths which are
predefined even if we choose, under restraints, the actual itinerary. Dewey’s aesthetics
bears in multiple ways upon Eco’s theme of the open or indeterminate nature of an art
work. His pragmatist aesthetics shows art works to be grounded in meaning-structures
that at all levels are perceived and not separable from their sense, no matter what their
signifying support structure should be. As Dewey writes: “[…] there are other meanings
that present themselves directly as possessions of objects which are experienced. Here
there is no need for a code or convention of interpretation; the meaning is as inherent in
immediate experience as is that of a flower garden.” (AE 89).
73 Such a contention by Dewey, looked at in light of the preceding tracing of the lost trail of
Dewey  in  Eco’s  work,  is  not  so  much  a  refutation  of  Eco’s  aesthetic  model  and  its
perceptual and social underpinning, as a pointer to what further paths in determining the
pragmatist dimensions of Eco’s work, beyond the Peircean, could profitably be pursued.
The Lost Trail of Dewey
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-1 | 2018
21
BIBLIOGRAPHY
DEWEY John, (1896/1998), “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” in Larry A. Hickman &
Thomas M. Alexander (eds), The Essential Dewey, vol. 2, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
DEWEY John, (1922/1983), Human Nature and Conduct, Critical Edition, Carbondale, Southern Illinois
University Press.
DEWEY John, (1925), Experience and Nature, Critical Edition, Carbondale, Southern Illinois
University Press.
DEWEY John, (1931), “Affective Thought,” in Id., Philosophy and Civilization, New York, Henry Holt.
DEWEY John, (1931), Philosophy and Civilization, New York, Henry Holt.
DEWEY John, (1934/2008), Art as Experience, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press (cited as
AE).
DEWEY John, (1935/1998), “Peirce’s Theory of Quality,” in Larry A. Hickman & Thomas M.
Alexander (eds), The Essential Dewey, vol. 2, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
DEWEY John, (1946), “Peirce’s Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought, and Meaning,” Journal of
Philosophy, 43.4, 85-95.
ECO Umberto, (1978), A Theory of Semiotics, Bloomington, Indiana University Press (cited as TS).
ECO Umberto, (1988), The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, trans. by Hugh Bredin, Cambridge, Harvard
University Press (cited as ATA).
ECO Umberto, (1989), The Open Work, trans. by Anna Cancogni, introduction by David Robey,
Cambridge, Harvard University Press (cited as OW).
ECO Umberto, (1991), The Limits of Interpretation, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
ECO Umberto, (1999), Kant and the Platypus: Essays on Language and Cognition, trans. by Alastair
McEwen, New York, Harcourt (cited as KP).
ECO Umberto, (2014), From the Tree to the Labyrinth: Historical Studies on the Sign and Interpretation,
trans. by Anthony Oldcorn, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
HICKMAN Larry A. & Thomas M. ALEXANDER (eds), (1998), The Essential Dewey, vol. 2, Bloomington,
Indiana University Press (cited as ED).
INNIS Robert E., (1994), Consciousness and the Play of Signs, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
INNIS Robert E., (2002), Pragmatism and the Forms of Sense: Language, Perception, Technics, University
Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press.
INNIS Robert E., (2007), “Dimensions of an Aesthetic Encounter,” in SunHee Kim Gertz, Jaan
Valsiner & Jean-Paul Breaux (eds), Semiotic Rotations: Modes of Meaning in Cultural Worlds, Charlotte,
Information Age Publishing, 113-34.
INNIS Robert E., (2009), Susanne Langer in Focus: The Symbolic Mind, Bloomington, Indiana University
Press.
The Lost Trail of Dewey
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-1 | 2018
22
INNIS Robert E., (2011), “The ‘Quality’ of Philosophy: On the Aesthetic Matrix of Dewey’s
Pragmatism,” in Larry A. Hickman, Matthew Caleb Flamm, Krzysztof Skowronski &
Jennifer A. Rea (eds), The Continuing Relevance of John Dewey: Reflections on Aesthetics, Morality,
Science, and Society, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 43-60.
INNIS Robert E., (2012), “The Reach of the Aesthetic and Religious Naturalism: Peircean and
Polanyi Reflections,” Tradition and Discovery, 38/3, 31-50.
INNIS Robert E., (2013), “Peirce’s Categories and Langer’s Aesthetics: On Dividing the Semiotic
Continuum,” Cognitio, 14.1, 35-50. Reprinted in Journal Phänomenologie, 45/2016, 20-34.
INNIS Robert E., (2014), “Dewey’s Peircean Aesthetics,” Cuadernos de Sistemática Peirceana, Bogatá,
Centro de Sistemática Peirceana, 139-60.
INNIS Robert E., (2016), “Energies of Objects: Between Dewey and Langer,” in Das
Entgegenkommende Denken, Berlin, Springer Verlag, 21-38.
INNIS Robert E., (2018), “Peirce and Dewey Speak about Art: Quality and the Theory of Signs,” To
appear in Semiotica, special issue on the relevance of Peirce’s later theory of signs.
PAREYSON Luigi, (1954), Estetica. Teoria della formatività, Turin, Edizioni di Filosofia.
SHKLOVSKY Viktor, (1917), “Art as Device,” now in Theory of Prose, trans. by Benjamin Sher,
Normal, Illinois, Dalkey Archive Press, 1990.
ABSTRACTS
Umberto Eco’s philosophical project, which culminates in the development of a systematic and
philosophically  relevant  semiotics,  has  a  perplexing  and  problematic  debt  to  and  link  with
pragmatism in its many forms. Indeed, his apparent relation to pragmatism as such is in fact
quite tangential if we ignore the pivotal role of Peirce in defining and supporting Eco’s explicit
semiotic  turn.  But  Eco  claimed  that  John  Dewey’s  Art  as  Experience,  the  foundation  of  a
distinctively pragmatist aesthetics, was a major factor in his early philosophical movement away
from certain premises of  the aesthetic tradition that held sway during his student days.  Eco
engages Dewey in surprising and enlightening ways in his early books, but the trail of Dewey is
gradually ‘lost.’ It is this trail, wandering through different contexts, that I follow in this paper. I
also indicate how Dewey’s work could have played a larger role in Eco’s mature aesthetic thought
and that we should see the absence of Dewey to represent a lost opportunity for emphasizing and
enriching the pragmatist side of a semiotic approach to aesthetics.
AUTHOR
ROBERT E. INNIS
University of Massachusetts Lowell and Aalborg University Denmark
rinnis41[at]gmail.com
The Lost Trail of Dewey
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-1 | 2018
23
